BYU Law Review
Volume 1980 | Issue 3

Article 6

9-1-1980

The Spanish Experience in Church-State Relations:
A Comparative Study of the Interrelationship
Between Church-State Identification and Religious
Liberty
George R. Ryskamp

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Religion Law Commons
Recommended Citation
George R. Ryskamp, The Spanish Experience in Church-State Relations: A Comparative Study of the Interrelationship Between Church-State
Identification and Religious Liberty, 1980 BYU L. Rev. 616 (1980).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1980/iss3/6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

The Spanish Experience in Church-State
Relations: A Comparative Study of the
Interrelationship Between Church-State
Identification and Religious Liberty*
On December 9, 1978, the people of Spain ratified a new
constitution whose article sixteen brings complete religious freedom to Spain for the first time in nearly half a century. Article
sixteen of the new Constitution also outlines a parallel change in
the identification of the Spanish State with the Spanish Catholic
Church. This Comment is the most recent Spanish answer to
two questions that have confronted constitution drafters since
Madison penned the first amendment to the United States Constitution: 1)to what degree should the state restrict the individual's free religious choice, and 2) to what extent should the state
identify with the church (or churches in a pluralistic society).
This Comment explores the interplay between these two questions in Spanish constitutional history, with particular emphasis
on developments since 1966.
Spain has been chosen for this comparative study for several reasons. First, its constitutional experience since 1800 has
included a wide variety of approaches to the religious question.
This large number of different approaches within basically the
same system of variables facilitates the development of a model
to demonstrate the relationship between church-state identification and religious freedom. Secondly, Spanish religious homogeneity-ninety-eight percent of the population nominally belongs
to only one church-is ideal for developing a model because it
contains fewer variables than the American pluralistic society.
Thirdly, the extensive but gradual changes that have occurred in
Spanish church-state relations since 1963 allow examination of
the model as it functions.

I. INTRODUCTION

OF THE

MODEL

Church-state questions involve two central issues: 1) state
* Unless otherwise indicated all tramlatiom from Spanish material are by the
author. The author did much of the research and observation that led to the writing of
this Comment while living and working in Madrid, Spain in the late 1970's.
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identification with one or more religious establishments versus
nonidentification by the state with religious establishments, and
2) religious freedom versus no religious freedom. Church-state
identification refers to the degree and type of interrelation between the state, as the governmental expression of society, and
the church, as the institutional manifestations of society's religious expression. In other words, the identification question refers to the relations of the state with the institutional manifestations of man's religious expression. Religious freedom refers to
the position taken by the state and the society toward the individual's forms of religious expression. Full religious freedom can
be described as the right to be free from societal and governmental coercion in religious matters. The degree to which a state
allows its citizens freedom from religious coercion is a measure
of the amount of religious freedom that that state provides.
For the purpose of developing a model to illustrate the relation between church-state identification and religious freedom,
the two concepts will be viewed as two separate lines:
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Although these concepts appear as polarities in the linear model,
they should be considered as spectra, distinct and not necessarily codeterminant, but obviously interrelated.
The identification line extends from one extreme where
identification is complete, meaning the church is the state,'
1. Such total identification is approached in the modern world only in certain Islamic states or in isolated situations such as Tibet prior to the Communist invasion.
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through a variety of "confessional states,"' to systems of clear
separation between church and state. From mere separation of
church and state this line continues to a position of negative
identification where the state is not merely indifferent or impartial toward religious establishments, but actually discourages, restricts, and even prohibits institutional manifestations of
religion?
At one extreme of the religious freedom line, the state protects the individual from all forms of coercion in religious matters. At the opposite extreme, the state denies religious freedom
to the individual and either demands adoption of a particular
religious creed or denies religious experience altogether. Between
the extremes on the religious freedom line lie varying degrees of
religious toleration, either for members of all churches or for
members of all but one church which might receive favorable
treatment or be entirely prohibited.
A brief overview of the church-state positions of several different countries will clarify the church-state model. The positions of the states that formed the original nucleus of the European Economic Community vary widely on the identification
line despite their common subscription to the principles of religious freedom outlined in the 1950 European Convention of
Rome and in the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights?
France has a system of total separation of church and state that
might best be characterized as a liberal indifference. Religious
institutions are treated basically the same as other civil associations and are allowed to function as they wish provided they do
not threaten public order as defined by the state.' Holland, by
contrast, has a system of separation, but the government maintains a more watchful legal stance toward religious association^.^
Belgium allows full religious liberty and officially recognizes no
2. A confessional state can be defined as one where the great majority of the political community practices a single religion and especially where the ethical, moral, and
social principles of this religion have decisively influenced the formation of the population's ethical-culturalheritage. See A. BERNARDEZ,
APUNTESSOBRE
REACCIONES
ENTRELA
IGLESIA
Y EL ESTADO
221 (1974).
3. M. FRAGA
IRIBARNE& J. PEREZ ALLANA,EL ESTADO
Y LA IGLESIA
EN ESPANA
30
(1972) [hereinafter cited as M. FFWGA].In developing the model the author has drawn
supra note 2,
ideas from several Spanish authors. See generally Id. at 30; A. BERNARDEZ,
LA LIBERTAD~ L I G I O S AEN LA COMUNIDAD
EUROPEA
at 18-21,35-65;C. CORRAL SALVADOR,
(1973).
4. See C. CORRAL
SALVADOR,
supra note 3, at 14-49.
5. See id. at 70-118.
6. See id. at 156-222.
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single religion, but its Constitution specifically authorizes the
payment of salaries and pensions for ministers of several "recognized" religions, including the Catholic, Protestant and Jewish
religions.' Luxembourg follows a similar pattern, but restricts
some activities of religious association^.^ Germany takes an
equally strong position on religious liberty. Although its Constitution declares there is to be no state church, major churches are
given special status as public associations, and the government
collects mandatory contributions for the two major denominations from their members?
Other parts of the world exhibit even greater diversity in
the patterns of church-state relations. The United States, by its
Constitution, lies within the separation of church and state portion of the identification line and on the freedom end of the religious liberty line. The Soviet Union is positioned on the negative
identification end of the separation of church and state line. On
the religious freedom line the Soviet Union is found, at least in
practice, on the heavy restriction side.1° England offers religious
freedom while maintaining a ceremonial identification with an
established church.ll In Sweden the Lutheran Church is the
state church, and non-Lutherans, especially Catholics, receive
only religious toleration.la In South America there are countries
spread across both lines with no readily apparent correlation between one line and the other?
By assigning the various countries positions on the lines of
the model according to their relative degrees of church-state
identification and religious freedom, the model appears this way:

7. See id. at 282-89.
8. See id. at 307-60.
9. See id. at 361-496.
supra note 3, at 30.
10. M. FRAGA,
SALVADOR,
supra note 3, at 38.
11. C. CORRAL
12. R. P A ~THIS
, IS SPAIN
377-78 (1951); C. COW

SALVADOR,
supra note 3, at

36.
CHURCH
AND STATE
IN LATINAMERICA
(rev. ed. 1966).
13. See generally J. MECHAM,
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Examination of the relationship between a country's position on the identification line versus its position on the religious
freedom line yields no clear pattern. The widely held belief that
decreasing religious freedom is synonymous with increasing
church-state identification is contradicted by the conditions in
countries such as the Islamic states and the Soviet Union which
are at the same end of the religious freedom line and at opposite
ends of the identification line. Apparently any degree of churchstate identification can be coupled with some form of religious
freedom or restriction. The following historical analysis of
church-state relations in Spain over the last 150 years will bring
this interrelationship into clearer focus through examination of
Spain's dramatic shifts in church-state identification and religious freedom.

A. Early Constitutional Period 1800-1869
By 1800 the Spanish State had sufficiently felt the impact of
both the Enlightenment and modern concepts of constitutionalism to make possible an evaluation of church-state relations in
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modern terms. At that time, Spain was found high on the positive end of the identification line and approaching no religious
freedom on the other line. Under the Concordat of 1753, the
Catholic Church was clearly state-established; more accurately,
it was controlled by the State.14
The first written Constitution, in 1812, evidenced little desire to change the position of high positive identification and no
religious freedom. A measure in the original draft had proposed
that "no citizen be inconvenienced in his religion, whatever it
might be," but was soundly defeated? The document as
adopted read: "The religion of the Spanish nation is, and shall
be perpetually, Apostolic Roman Catholic, the only true religion.
The nation protects it by wise and just laws and prohibits the
exercise of any other, whatsoever."16
The fact that this otherwise liberal document provided for
high identification and no religious freedom was indicative of
the view held by most Spaniards concerning the role of the
Catholic Church. Most interests of the Church and the State
were, in the minds of the people, synonymous. The implementing legislation, however, indicated that not all interests of the
Church and the State were parallel. The Cortes (national legislative body) took action against the Inquisition and the Catholic
0rders.17 When the members of the Church hierarchy protested
these measures, several bishops were exiled or imprisoned and
the papal nuncio was expelled from Spain. When Ferdinand VII
returned to the throne he declared all actions of the 1811 Cortes
null and void, and therefore these anti-church actions by the
Cortes were never fully implemented.18
In 1820 a military revolt forced Ferdinand VII to convoke a
Cortes and reinstate the Constitution of 1812. Many of the leaders of the revolt were active Masons and were very liberal for
their time? After coming to power, the liberal government
moved immediately against the Church. The Jesuits and at least
one bishop were expelled, other orders were severely restricted
14. E. PEERS, SPAIN,THE CHURCHAND THE ORDERS
56-58 (1945).
15. J. MONROY,
LIBERTAD
RELIGIOSA
Y ECUMENISMO
74 (1967).
16. Constitution of 1812, tit. 11, ch. 11, art. 12 translated in A. VERDUIN,
MANUAL
OF
SPANISH
CONSTITUTIONS
1808-1931, at 12 (1941). This book contains good English translations of all Spanish constitutional documents up to and including the 1931
Constitution.
17. J. HUGHEY,
RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM
IN SPAIN
18 (2nd ed. 1970).
18. Id.
19. R. SMITH,SPAIN:
A MODERN
HISTORY
302 (1965).
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and Church property was seized? A period of violent anticlericalism in various parts of the country followed in which many
monks, nuns, and clergy lost their lives." Without changing the
Constitution of 1812 the government and society had turned the
high positive identification between the Church and the State
into an attempt to control the Church by force and intimidation.
Foreign intervention, under the direction of Metternich and
Talleyrand, freed the monarch and restored reactionary rule and
the Church's position. That position remained the same until
the death of Ferdinand, when his daughter, Isabel 11, and her
supporters (generally the more liberal portions of Spanish society) came into power? At this time Spain experienced nationwide anticlerical riots where "[hlundreds of religious houses
were wholly or partially destroyed by fire; hundreds of priests
and laymen were killed; [and] hundreds of works of art [were]
lost for ever [sic]."" The government did not quell the rioting,
rather it chose to expel the Jesuits, close religious houses, and
seize the Church's lands to help pay the costs of the civil war.24
This strong anticlerical sentiment had greatly subsided by 1837
when a new Constitution was drafted and moderate groups tempered the constitutional convention.
The Constitution of 1837 was a statement of classical nineteenth century liberalism and "served as a model for the structure of most of the later nineteenth century Spanish constitutions?
In the area of religion, the Constitution was
surprisingly moderate. Title I, article 11,the only provision pertaining to religion, reads: "The nation is obliged to maintain the
cult and the ministers of the Catholic religion which Spaniards
profess."2s
Despite the Constitution's positive identification of the
Spanish State and society with the Catholic Church, the anticlerical attitude of the government continued. During the regency of the progressive General Espartero," bishops and priests
were removed from office, bishops were appointed without the
20. E. PEERS,
supra note 14, at 64-65.
21. Id. at 65-66, 69-71.
22. Id. at 68-71.
23. Id. at 71.
24. R. SMITH,supra note 19, at 315-16.
supra note 16, at 40.
25. A. VERDUIN,
26. Id. at 41.
27. Espartero became regent in May 1841 and was forced to flee Spain in July 1843.
R. S m , supra note 19, at 323-25.
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approval of Rome, and the nunciature was closed.18 A series of:
provocative exchanges between the government and the Vatican
followed, and the Pope addressed an encyclical to the world on
the sad state of the Spanish Church, calling on all Catholics to
pray for change.%@
In 1844 after nearly a decade of turbulent Progressive rule,
the Moderates once again regained control and drafted a new
~ ~ approach to
and extremely conservative C o n s t i t u t i ~ n .The
church-state relations was representative of the Moderate policy
of reconciliation with the Church. Article eleven in the new Constitution read: "The religion of the Spanish nation is the Apostolic Roman Catholic religion. The State binds itself to maintain
the cult and its rninister~."~~
The Penal Code of 1848, a key part of the implementing
legislation, is illustrative of the high degree of identification between the Spanish State and the Catholic Church under the
Constitution of 1845. While there were no penalties for failure to
practice the Catholic religion or for personally rejecting Catholic
dogma, the penalties for public acts against the Church or its
dogmas were severe. Anyone who tried to change or abolish the
Roman Catholic religion or who celebrated public acts of worship of a non-Catholic religion could be imprisoned for twelve to
twenty years. Lesser prison sentences were imposed for "inculcating the non-observance of the religious precepts, or making
mock of the sacraments of the Church, or persisting in publishIming doctrines condemned by the ecclesiastical authoritie~."~~
plementation of this code moved the Spanish State toward extreme non-religious freedom and enhanced the positive
identification of the Church with the State.
The identification of the Catholic Church and the State was
further enhanced by the concordat negotiated with the Vatican
in 1851.ssArticle one is representative of this document's total
commitment to church-state identification:
The Apostolic Roman Catholic religion, which with the exclusion of all other cults continues to be the only one of the Spanish nation, will be conserved always in the domains of His
J. HUGHEY,
supra note 17, at 21-22.
Id.
A. VERDUIN,
supra note 16, at 45.
Id. at 46.
32. J. HUGHEY,
supra note 17, at 22-23.
33. E. PEERS,
supra note 14, at 79.

28.
29.
30.
31.
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Catholic Majesty, with all the rights and prerogatives which it
should enjoy according to the law of God and the prescriptions
of the sacred canon^.^'

The church-state identification imposed by the Concordat
of 1851 eliminated religious freedom, completing the impetus
given by the Constitution of 1845 and the Penal Code of 1848.
All instruction, both public and private, was to be controlled by
the Catholic hierarchy and in accordance with Catholic dogma.
The public authorities were to support the clergy in all their activities, especially those involving censorship of undesirable
propaganda. The special privileges enjoyed by Catholic clergy
under Canon law were protected by the government. The
Church was guaranteed the right to hold property and the government agreed to pay all the clergy a stipend as remuneration
for the property seized during the past century.86
Most of the opposition to the Concordat came from the
Progessives (liberals) who were out of power. Some opposition to
such high positive identification of the Church and the State was
raised by individuals in the Church.86These individuals feared
that too close an association between Church and State would
work to the Church's detriment. Their fears concerning the subordination of the Catholic Church to the State were soon confirmed when the liberals once again gained control of the government in 1854.Neither the Constitution, the Penal Code, nor the
Concordat prevented the liberals from immediately renewing
their attack on the Church. An expropriation law was enacted to
take away the lands returned to the Church under the Concordat and any property newly acquired by the religious orders.
The Jesuits were once again expelled, several bishops and the
nuncio were exiled, all religious processions in the streets were
banned, and government censorship was imposed on Catholic
newspapers." All of these actions were not intended to establish
religious freedom, rather they were intended to disestablish the
Catholic Church, or at least reduce it to total subservience to the
State.
Only two years later the Moderates regained control of the
government and reinstated the Constitution of 1845 with its
34.
35.
36.
37.

J. HUGHEY,
supra note 17, at 23.
R. PA-,
supra note 12, at 348-49.
See id. at 72.
J. HUGHEY,
supra note 17, at 23-24, E. PEERS,
supra note 14, at 85.
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high positive identification and total lack of religious freedom.
This remained the position of the Spanish government until the
revolution of 1868, which deposed Isabel I1 and brought the liberals back into power?
Several characteristics of Spanish church-state relations are
evident in this early period. Perhaps most obvious is the ease
with which a change in government brought a shift from positive
identification to negative, antichurch identification. Based on
this history, positive identification and negative identification
appear to be closely related. Equally clear is the fact that religious freedom is not an inherent characteristic of either positive
or negative church-state identification. Religious freedom was
never a part of any Constitution from 1812 to 1869 and was defeated when proposed for inclusion in both liberal and conservative Constitutions.

B. The Constitution of 1869 and the First Republic
At the beginning of the revolution of 1868, local revolutionary committees took immediate actions against the Catholic
Church. Some local bishops and priests as well as the Jesuits
Several of
were expelled, and many chapels were confis~ated.~@
the local juntas declared religious freedom a universal principle,
yet ironically, ordered the demolition of local Catholic churches.
The provisional government in Madrid suppressed the Jesuits,
closed certain monasteries and convents, and granted permission
for the establishment of several non-Catholic schools. It also ordered the confiscation of all libraries, archives, museums, and
art collections held by the Church/O Religious freedom became
the official policy of the Spanish government. The complicated
questions concerning relations between the Catholic Church and
the State were deferred to the constituent power.41That constituent power took the form of a new Cortes that was elected in
1869. Its first task was to draft a new Constitution.
The articles on religion in the proposed draft evoked widespread debate, in which three basic positions emerged: 1) those
who favored a return to absolute Catholic unity as manifested in
the Constitution of 1845; 2) those who favored a total separation
38.
39.
40.
41.

R. HERR,AN HISTORICAL
ESSAYON MODERN
SPAIN103-05 (1971).
J. HUGHEY,
supra note 17, at 34.
Id. at 36.
Id.
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of church and state and religious freedom for all (although, ironically this group also favored anti-Catholic legislation as the only
means of reducing the Catholic Church's immense power); and
3) those who sought some form of compromise, either by maintaining the positive identification of the Catholic Church with
the State while granting minimal religious toleration to nonCatholic individuals, or conversely, by granting religious freedom but maintaining some identification of the Church and the
State in recognition of the basically Catholic nature of the Spanish people.'The latter compromise approach held sway in the
Constitution of 1869 as finally promulgated-in title I, article 21:
The nation binds itself to maintain the cult and the ministers of the Catholic religion.
The public or private observance of any other cult is guaranteed to all foreigners resident in Spain, without any further
limitations than the universal rules of morality and rightAll the provisions of the preceding paragraph are applicable to those Spanish people who profess religion other than
Catholici~m.'~

The legislation adopted under the Constitution of 1869 implemented the policy of religious freedom. The new Penal Code
promulgated in 1870 offered protection to all religions. It punished anyone who forced others to practice religious acts or who
hindered or disturbed religious services. The legislative provisions remained completely neutral in regard to Catholicism."
Civil registry of births, marriages, and deaths was instituted. Because religious marriages were no longer recognized, there were
no prohibitions against their accompanying the civil marriage.4s
Orders were issued providing for the burial of non-Catholics in
the cemeterie~.'~
Non-Catholic children were excused from religious i n s t r ~ c t i o n . ~ ~
The Constitution of 1869 and the religious freedom it enshrined were short-lived. After two turbulent years, the new king
of Spain abdi~ated:~and a republic was proclaimed. Religious
Id. at 38-49.
Constitution of 1869, tit. I, art. 21, translated in A. VERDUIN,supra note 16,at

J . HUGHEY,
supra note 17, at 54.
Id.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 55.
R. SMITH,supra note 19, at 357.
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freedom was to be augmented by the separation of the Catholic
Church and the State in the proposed draft of a republican constitution.'* This draft was never debated in the full Cortes because the dissatisfaction with the instability of the Republic became so great that in December, 1874, several generals declared
Isabel 11's son, Alfonso XII, King of Spain.'O
This period represented, for the first time in Spanish history, a move toward the religious freedom end of the line and a
concurrent move away from the extremes of positive or negative
identification. The implementing legislation, defining the parameters of the constitutional grant of religious freedom, not only
protected the individual from antireligious governmental action,
but also assured Catholics that they were to be equally protected
from a governmental switch to negative identification. One unanswered question was whether separation of the Catholic
Church and the State, as proposed in the draft constitution of
the First Republic, could have been achieved without endangering the religious freedom of the Catholic majority.

C. The Constitution of 1876
The Constitution of the Restoration, promulgated in 1876,
brought at least a minimum of stability to Spain and was in
force until 1931, longer than any other Spanish Constitution. In
an attempt to achieve political unity and stability, the Constitution of 1876 tried to satisfy the Catholic Church and its partisans, more than the constitution of 1869 had done, yet still
salve the consciences of the liberals.61 In an effort to forge a
compromise acceptable to at least a large majority, the Constitution of 1876 enshrined a new concept in Spanish history: reli49. The articles on religion in the Constitution proposed in 1873 read:
Article 34-The observance of all cults shall be free in Spain.
Article 35-The church is separated from the state.
Article 36-The direct or indirect subsidizing of any cult is forbidden to the
,
nation or federal state, and to regional states, and municipalities.
Article 37-Records of birth, marriage, and death shall be registered by the
civial [sic] authorities.
A. VERDUIN,supra note 16, at 70.
50. R. HERR,
supra note 38, at 110.
51. Two diametrically opposed foreign influences were also being balanced: papal
pressure which extended to the point of a papal decree specifically condemning the
paragraphs in the 1876 Constitution dealing with the concept of religious toleration, and
pressure from the more liberal nations, particularly Britain, whose embassies and consulates frequently intervened on behalf of non-Catholics who were being harassed or
persecuted.
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gious toleration.
Article 11-The Apostolic Roman Catholic religion is the religion of the state. The nation binds itself to maintain this cult
and its ministers.
No one in Spanish territory shall be molested for his religious opinions, or for the observance of his particular form of
worship, provided that he shows proper respect to Christian
morality.
Public manifestations and ceremonies other than those of
the religion of the state, however, shall not be ~ermitted.~'

The identification between the Catholic Church and the State
remained relatively positive and the Church maintained a position of great favor and control, but non-Catholic sects were legally recognized, and freedom of conscience and private religious
practice were tolerated.
Toleration proved to be a concept that lent itself to a variety of interpretations and practices. The point where Spain was
found on the religious freedom line varied greatly depending on
the government in power. During the early years of the Conetitution of 1876, the interpretation of religious toleration in the
Royal Order of October 1876 pushed the definition of religious
toleration as close to no religious freedom as was possible within
the constitutional framework:
1. From this date all public manifestations of the cults or
sects dissident from the Catholic religion are forbidden outside
the precincts of their temples or cemeteries.

2. For the effects of the previous rule, by public manifestation
will be understood everything in the street or on the exterior
walls of the temple or of the cemetery which gives knowledge
of the ceremonies, rites, usages, and customs of the dissident
cult, including signs, banners, emblems, advertisements, and
posters.6s

Under the Constitution of 1876, civil marriage was denied to
those who were Catholics-although civil registration of the canonical marriage was r e q ~ i r e dformer
;~
priests and monks were
not allowed to marry; anti-Catholic statements were not permitted to be published by the press;ss religion was taught in the
52.
53.
54.
55.

A. VERDUIN,
supra note 16, at 78.
J. HUGHEY,
supra note 17, at 87-88.
S. DE MADARIAGA,
SPNN:A MODERN
HISTORY
162-63 (1958).
J. HUGHEY,
supra note 17, at 71-72.
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public school^;^ and attendance at mass was compulsory for
those in the armed forces.67
During the early twentieth century, a slight trend toward
religious freedom emerged. Under the liberal government of
1910, the restrictions on public manifestations of non-Catholic
religions were modified to allow signs and symbols on the
outside of Protestant churches and to permit some public meetings." During this period several courts upheld the rights of
non-Catholics in cases involving freedom of conscience and personal religious actions." Mandatory attendance at mass for
those serving in the armed forces was also relaxed.@OThe government manifested a willingness to treat fairly those who chose not
to adhere to the Catholic dogma as long as they did not openly
proselyte or openly criticize or ridicule Catholic beliefs and
practices.
On the surface, the Constitution of 1876 had achieved peace
and stability, but the compromises making that possible failed
to reach the underlying stresses and strains in the fabric of
Spanish society. Inability to participate effectively in the electoral process eventually alienated the industrial workers, the agrarian poor, and the liberal intellectual^.^^ As new doctrines of
communism, anarchism, and socialism grew, the political system
deteriorated. Finally, in 1923, Miguel Primo de Rivera, declared
himself military dictator."
Under Primo de Rivera, the doctrine of religious toleration
was restricted to its narrowest definition and virtually eliminated. Many of the Church supporters of the dictator believed
the policies of the liberals in broadening religious freedom had
contributed to a general decline in order. The new Penal Code of
1928, which replaced that of 1870, returned to the concepts embodied in the Penal Code of 1848. It was again a crime to attempt to abolish the religion of the State or to mock the Catholic Church. Any public manifestation of a non-Catholic faith was
punishable by three to six years in prison."
56. Id. at 105. However, religious study was not mandatory for primary or secondary
students whose parents were not Catholic. Id.
57. Id. at 106.
58. Id. at 108.
59. Id. at 109-10.
60. Id. at 107.
61. R. HERR, supra note 38, at 115, 136-37.
62. R. S ~ Hsupra
, note 19, at 404.
63. J. HUGHEY,
supra note 17, at 110-12.
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Several important concepts are evident from the. history of
the Constitution of 1876. First, considerable latitude exists
within a broad constitutional grant of religious toleration which,
depending on the implementing legislation, allows for greater or
lesser religious freedom. Secondly, it is possible to maintain relatively close church-state identification and still have some religious freedom. Thirdly, as long as religious toleration is maintained, no crossover to negative identification arises. The
following section demonstrates that only when Primo de Rivera
eliminated religious toleration did the positive identification become sufficiently high to prompt the transition to negative identification under the Second Republic.

D. The Constitution of 1931 and the Second Republic
In 1931, after the fall of Primo de Rivera, the King allowed
free municipal elections that resulted in a substantial victory for
the Republicans." Hoping to avoid civil war, Alfonso XI11 went
into voluntary exile, and a provisional Republican government
came to power? This government acted immediately to reduce
the powers of those segments of society that had supported the
monarchy. The army was reorganized, and its power was restricted. Separation of church and state became a primary
objecti~e.~~
A new Cortes was elected to draft a new constitution. The
vast majority of the deputies elected were either Socialist or Republican.67 As a result, the document they produced was much
too liberal for much of the country that identified closely with
Catholicism, but after years of repression the group now in control was not interested in compromise. The positive identification of the Primo de Rivera years made possible a simple and
rapid transition to negative identification.
In the Cortes the debate on the Constitution proceeded
smoothly until the first of the religious articles. The draft written by the provisional government called for separation of
church and state, but gave the Catholic Church the position of a
special corporation de derecho publico (of public right). This
moderate approach was unacceptable to a majority of the depu64. R. SMITH,
supra note 19, at 413.

65. Id.
66. Id. at 431-32.
67. R. HERR,supra note at 38, at 158.
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ties who proposed total separation of church and state.68Their
viewpoint clearly dominated the religious articles as adopted:
Article 3-The Spanish state has no official religion.
Article 26-All religious denominations shall be considered associations subject to special laws.
The state, regions, provinces, and municipalities may not
maintain, favour, or subsidize financially churches or religious
associations and institutions.
Those religious orders which impose by rule, in addition to
the three canonical vows, the special vow of obedience to an
authority other than the state, are dissolved. Their property
shall be nationalized and employed for charitable and educational purposes.
The other religious orders shall be subject to a special law
voted by this constituent Cortes on the following basis:
1) Dissolution of those orders which, by their activities,
constitute a menace to the safety of the state. . . .
3) Inability to acquire and hold, either by themselves or
through an agent, any more property than that assigned, after
previous justification, for their support or for the direct attainment of their particular aims;
4) Prohibition of their participation in industry, commerce, or teaching.
6) .
The property of the religious orders may be
nationalized.
Article 27-Liberty of conscience and the right to profess and
practice any religion freely are guaranteed in Spanish territory,
save for due respect to demands of public morality.
Cemeteries shall be subject exclusively to civil jurisdiction.
There may not be a separation of districts therein for religious
reasons.
All denominations may observe their rites privately. Public
manifestations of the cults must be authorized, in any case, by
the government.
No one may be compelled to declare officially his religious
beliefs.6s

..

...

Since a majority of the Spanish people were still Catholic,
these articles must be viewed as a form of negative identification
or hostile separation of church and state rather than as establishing religious freedom. This attitude is equally evident in the
details of the separation of church and state, normally left to
68. J. HUGHEY,
supra note 17, at 120-25.
69. A. VERDUIN,
supra note 16, at 85, 88-89.
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implementing legislation, which were spelled out in the Constitution of the Second Republic. Even ardent supporters of the
Republic today recognize that the treatment of the religious
question was ineffective and counterproductive, and probably
the gravest error the Republicans made.70

E. The Franco Period to 1963
The actions of the Second Republic solidified Catholic opposition to the Republic and won Catholic support for Franco's
forces when the Army finally revolted in 1936. The military revolt was heralded as a crusade to save the Church from the communist infidels of the Republican g~vernment.~'The civil war
lasted nearly three years, leaving the country "exhausted materially and psych~logically."~~
A hundred thousand young men had
been killed in the fighting and nearly half a million people were
in exile.7s
During the civil war there were numerous antireligious
atrocities committed by both sides. Catholic worship was suspended during the war in all Repubican-held areas outside of
the Basque countries; many churches were converted to other
Thousands of clergy were killed-many
purposes or de~troyed.'~
brutally murdered in cold-blooded executions for no other crime
than having been a priest." Such actions were not limited to the
Republican side. The Basque clergy, the most closely united
with their people of any clergy in Spain, supported the Republic,
and, as a result, large numbers of them were executed by Franco
70. E. PEERS,supra note 14, at 155. The Republican government, and the implementing legislation it passed were so anticlerical that some people characterized the Republican government as a "Holy Anti-clerical Church." The deputies of the govemxhent
not onIy adopted a divorce law, but enacted a law allowing for divorce by mutual consent
after two years of marriage without any requirement of governmental approval. J. CROW,
SPAIN:
THEROOTAND THE FLOWER
311 (1975). The cemeteries were not merely opened to
all people, but a law was passed forbidding any form of religious burial unless it was
specifically requested in a written will. Id. at 263. All Church properties were nationalized except those used for worship and all religious orders were forbidden to take part in
supra note
any industrial, commercial, agricultural, or educational activities. E. PEERS,
14, at 147-49.
71. J. CROW,
supra note 70, at 320. See also P. BLANSHARD,
FRJXEDOM
AND CATHOLIC
IN SPAIN
AND PORTUGAL
21 (1962).
POWER
72. R. HERR,supra no& 38, at 211.
73. Id.
74. J. HUGHEY,
supra note 17, at 132-33.
supra note 14, at 167-76.
75. E. PEERS,
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forces." Whether there was positive identification or negative
identification, where no guarantees of religious freedom existed,
the Church and its clergy suffered when their course did not
parallel that of the government in power.
With the victory of the Franco forces, positive identification
became official Spanish policy, and the doctrine of Catholic
unity was stronger than a t any time since the Inquisition. As at
the time of the Inquisition, during the first twenty years under
Franco all forms of repression were evident: censorship of the
press," imprisonment for purely politico-religious crimes, and
outright persecution of non-Catholic sects.18
To insure the very high identification of the Catholic
Church and the State and to help legitimize his government,
Franco negotiated a new Concordat in 1953. The traditional
power of patronage was extended to Franco, which allowed him
to control the Church by submitting to the Pope the names from
which any new bishops would be selected. Under the Concordat
the Church was given such traditional privileges as the annual
financial grant to clergy (this time with an escalation clause) and
immunity for the clergy from arrest and imprisonment. Canon
law was made an integral part of the governing law of Spain.
Compulsory religious education was provided as a part of educational instruction in all institutions of learning, whether stateowned or church-owned. The Catholic Church was to be the sole
religion, and the only concession to religious toleration was that
children of non-Catholic parents could be excused from the
mandatory religion classes.79
Beginning in 1947 a written constitutional framework was
developed. The religion clauses found in title I, chapter I of the
Fuero, the Spanish Bill of Rights originally read:
The profession and practice of the Catholic religion, which
is that of the Spanish State, will enjoy official protection.
Nobody will be molested because of his religious beliefs or
the private exercise of his cult. No external ceremonies or manifestations will be permitted except those of the Catholic
76. J. HUGHEY,
Supra note 17, at 133. See also CENTRO
DE INFORMACI~N
CAT~LICA
EL CLEROY LOS CATOLICOS
VASCO-SEPARATISTAS
Y EL MOVIMIENTO
NAINTERNACIONAL,
CIONAL (1974).
supra note 17, at 140, 142.
77. J. HUGHEY,
78. Id. at 142-43.
supra note 71, at 267-74; J. CROW,
supra note 70, at 353.
79. P. BLANSHARD,
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This amounted to an explicit statement of the most conservative
interpretation of the religious toleration concept of the Constitution of 1876, and in practice restricted non-Catholics more than
any nineteenth-century approach.

Periods of strong positive identification or strong negative
identification in all of the cases so far considered have also been
periods of little or no religious freedom. Such is the case in the
Communist countries, in Franco Spain, in the Spain of 1848, and
in the Islamic confessional states. As a country moves toward
greater positive identification or negative identification, religious
freedom decreases. This suggests a modification of the model.
The straight line representing church-state identification ought
to be bent into a loop and placed over the religious freedom line
so that both the negative identification and the total identification ends of the line are above the no religious freedom end of
that line.

Some Identification
of Church and State

i

Positive Identification

I

I
Total Religious
Freedom

Religious
Toleration

No Religious
Freedom

Bending the identification line and placing both positive
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and negative identification over the no religious freedom portion
of the freedom line illustrates two further principles that can be
derived from the model:
1) High positive identification of the church with the state
and negative identification are very close, which allows for relative ease of transition from one to the other. During several periods of Spanish history the government took actions-without
any change in the written constitution-that represented a high
degree of negative identification. Where no religious freedom exists, there appears to be no protection against a rapid transition
from high positive identification of church and state to antichurch or negative identification actions.
2) The model suggests that movement along the identllication line would require some corresponding movement on the religious liberty line and vice versa. A country may, therefore,
move away from the religious freedom section of the line by confusing anti-identification actions with those designed to provide
religious freedom. This was precisely what happened in both
Spanish Republics. Legislation designed to eliminate the identification of the Catholic Church with the State resulted in the
elimination of any vestiges of religious freedom. The opposite is
also possible since increasing church-state identification is usually associated with decreasing religious freedom.
A more general principle that can be derived from the
model is that there can be a variety of identification approaches
associated with religious freedom, including either separation of
church and state or some church-state identification. While
Spain has had little experience in this area, the positioning of
other European nations along the curved portion of the loop illustrates this diversity.
Several additional conclusions, specifically relevant to contemporary Spanish experience (although with some general application), need to be mentioned. First, the importance of implementing legislation is made clear by the circumstances
surrounding the constitutions of 1837, 1876, and 1931. In each
instance, apparently moderate positions in the written constitutions were pushed completely outside the area of religious liberty by the implementing legislation. Secondly, written laws
dealing with religious matters can remain the same while the actual governmental practice affecting religious freedom changes
dramatically. Such was the case under the Constitution of 1876,
and the same is true of the modern Communist states with their
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constitutional guarantees of religious freedom. Thirdly, because
of positive identification throughout Spain's entire constitutional period, the Catholic Church became more and more an
integral part of the ruling oligarchy and closely tied, therefore,
to conservative politics. This alignment prevented the Church
from maintaining the viability and flexibility necessary to be an
independent institution. Thus, the Church was unable to meet
the challenges of changing political and social situations.
IV. SPANISH
CHURCH-STATE
RELATIONS
1963-1978
Beginning as early as the mid-nineteenth century, foreign
powers opposed the high church-state identification in Spain
and the lack of religious freedom. This opposition came from
two primary sources, the Vatican and non-Catholic liberal countries such as Britain and the United States. While the influence
of the former has been obvious during the entire constitutional
period of Spanish history, the latter's influence became increasingly important during the Franco period following the 1953
treaty between Spain and the United States. The growth of
American military installations and international tourism in
Spain also added foreign pressures.81 The reality of these pressures is evidenced by the fact that when Spanish laws of religious toleration were introduced toward the end of the Franco
period, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs played a leading
role in their adoption.8s
In earlier Spanish history, foreign pressure for increased religious freedom had always been counteracted by pressure from
the Vatican to maintain Catholic unity. That situation changed
dramatically in the early 1960's because of Vatican 11. In 1965
the international Catholic Church adopted an encyclical on religious freedom:' wherein, for the first time, the Catholic Church
officially encouraged religious freedom for all countries. The
Spanish bishops at that conference were the strongest and most
outspoken opponents of the new policy;84 nevertheless, it was
clear that changes were necessary in Spain.
Following Vatican I1 an amendment to the religious article
of the Fuero, the Spanish Bill of Rights, was proposed as part of
81. J. HUGHEY,
supra note 17, v-vi, J. MONROY,
supra note 15, at 60.
82. J. HUGHEY,
supra note 17, at v-vi.
supra note 15, at 52.
83. J. MONROY,
84. N. COOPER,
CATHOLICISM
AND THE ~
C REGIME
O
29 (1975).
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an entire reworking of the Spanish constitutional framework
under the Organic Law of 1967. The first paragraph of that article, which established positive identification of church and state,
was left intact, but the following declaration of religious freedom
was added: "The State will assume the protection of religious
liberty which will be guaranteed by effective juridical tutelage
that at the same time safeguards public morality and order."86
The legislation implementing this modification was more effective than the ambiguous language of the constitutional guarantee in causing real movement along the religious liberty line.
And, perhaps of even more significance, Spain was about to experience more than a decade of trauma in church-state relations
which would gradually move it on the identification line to a
point where religious liberty became a real possibility.
At the beginning of this period forces were mounting that
would make changes in the structure of church-state relations in
Spain inevitable. One, already discussed briefly, was the amount
of pressure from the Vatican and from democratic countries demanding changes in return for greater integration of Spain into
the community of nations. At this same time Spain was experiencing extensive social changes. The economic improvements
that accompanied the rapid growth of the large cities and which
triggered a large influx of tourists with foreign ideas wrought
many changes in Spanish society.86 Both the Catholic Church
and the Spanish government felt the impact of such changes,
however, the Church reacted first. The year 1966 marked the establishment of the Conferencia Episcopal Espafiola (CEE) in
which all Spanish bishops participated in making national
Church decisions, rather than only the twelve or thirteen archbishop~.~'The result was that many younger, more liberal bishops, and through them, younger priests and lay members, now
had a means of effectively expressing their opinions, which more
closely paralleled those of the international Catholic Church as
expressed in Vatican 11.
Conservative groups stood against these forces for change in
church-state relations, and in spite of their clear minority statue,
they held effective power in both Church and State matters. The
Church was dominated by older Franco-appointed prelates
85. h e r o de los Espandles, tit. I, ch. I, art. 6,LEYEs FUNDAMENTALES
DEL REINO
(1976).
86. See R. HERR,supra note 38,at 19-25.
87. F. GIL DELCAM),
C O N F L IIGLESU-&TAM)
~
191-92(1975).

'
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whose ultraconservative position and outspoken intransigence at
Vatican I1 focused the attention of the world on the archaic, if
not absurd, conditions in the Spanish Church." The government
was controlled by staunch Francoists who saw Catholic unity
and national Catholicism as the principal bulwarks of the authoritarian, oligarchic state upon which their power and positions were based?@These groups waged an unsuccessful, though
protracted, battle to keep Spain high on the positive end of the
identification line and definitely on the no religious liberty portion of the other line.
The forces pushing for modifications in church-state relations in Spain reflected the extensive changes in Spanish society.
By 1966 those forces were much more evident in the Church
than in the State. As the Church tried to induce Spain to adopt
less church-state identification the State resisted, resulting in a
series of conflicts between the Catholic Church and the Spanish
government.
In 1968 the CEE established a commission to analyze the
condition of the Church in Spain. In response to the commission's survey the CEE called for elections of priests to an Asemblea Conjunta de Sacerdotes y Obispos (Joint Assembly of
Priests and Bishops) to be held in 1971.@O The resolutions
adopted by the Joint Assembly clergy amounted to an expression on the part of the Church which was tantamount to wholesale transformation.@l
The Church was now conscious of the needs of the people
and of the political situation under which they lived. The Joint
Assembly passed measures calling for an elimination of all civic
and political discrimination based on faith or religion, and calling for the Church hierarchy to speak out when human rights
were violated. Another resolution called for the right of the people within the Church to choose their own bishops. Other proposals called for a revision of the 1953 Concordat or preferably
its replacement with a series of partial agreements. One especially interesting proposal, which passed by a vote of 215 to 26,
stated: "The juridical ordering which regulates relations between
the Church and the State must safeguard the autonomy and independence of both and, without diminishing the healthy coop88. See N. COOPER,supra note $4, at 29.
89. J. MONROY,supra note 15, at 51-52.
90. F. GIL DELGADO,supra note 87, at 26.
91. Id. at 27-28.
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eration between them for the common good, eliminate every real
or apparent situation of mutual concession of privilege^."^'
The Church desired to move on the identification line to a
point of mutual independence, eliminating even the appearance
of mutual concessions of privileges. This desire to lessen churchstate identification reflects the significant changes that occurred
in the 1960's in the Spanish Church hierarchy. The combined
effects of natural attrition and Pope Paul VI's petition that all
bishops retire at age seventy-five eliminated nearly a dozen of
the most conservative prelates; on the other hand, only two of
those viewed as liberal passed away during the same period. In
replacing these men, the Pope appointed liberals who viewed the
Church and its role in harmony with the perspective of Vatican
II?
The emergence of a new philosophical orientation was clear
evidence of change in the Spanish Church during the early
1970's. Gone was the National Catholicism of the civil war years
and in its place appeared a universalist outlook that embraced
the doctrines of Vatican I1 and world Catholicism. The Church
was, and is, struggling to shed its image as one of the principal
pillars of the ruling oligarchy, and thereby realign itself with the
working and middle classes. Several of the bishops have called
for greater social justice and have instituted extensive social reform programs in their dioceses." Even the Jesuits, who in the
past were bastions of traditionalism, have become reformers by
organizing institutes for teaching theology to laymen.s6
The Vatican has had at least a supportive role in all the
changes that have taken place. Despite government opposition,
liberal bishops have continually been appointed, and when governmental opposition has become too great, the Vatican has circumvented provisions of the Concordat by leaving the bishoprics
officially vacant and appointing auxiliary bishops for whom no
. ~ 1967 the Pope sent Luigi
government approval is n e c e s ~ a r yIn
Dadaglio, a liberal with worldwide experience in difficult churchstate situations, as nuncio to Madrid. He was specifically instructed to push the conciliar movement forward in Spain?
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
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Dadaglio's involvement at some points became so great that he
was personally attacked in the press and widely criticized, especially by the conservative elements in Spanish society." However, instead of cooperating with Spanish conservatives in state
and church matters, Pope Paul continually rewarded liberal
Spanish bishops with Cardinal's hats while passing over older,
more conservative bishops.s9
On the international level the Spanish Church and clergy
are still very conservative; for example, the Spanish clergy
wholeheartedly endorsed Pope Paul VI's ultraconservative encyclical on sex,loObut the position of the Spanish Church in
Spanish society has been dramatically liberalized since 1967.

A. State Conflict with the Church 1967-1975
The changes in the Catholic Church brought it into direct
and nearly continual conflict with the Spanish State until
Franco's death. By the end of the 1960's the bishops of Spain
encountered steadily increasing opposition from the government
as they tried to bring the Church closer to the people. As early
as 1966 the Church felt the wrath of public pressure over the
government sponsored appointment of a non-Catalan to the
Archbishopric of Barcelona.lol
Perhaps the strongest evidence of the growing conflict was
the 1971 statement from the Asemblea Conjunta (Joint Assembly) in which Spanish bishops and priests called for independence and autonomy for the Church from the State.lo2The Joint
Assembly barely missed the two-thirds majority required to pass
a resolutionin obvious reference to the Church's civil war involvement-that stated: "We humbly recognize and ask forgiveness for not having been true ministers of reconciliation, when it
was necessary."lo3 The days when the Church was solidly united
with the State, as it had been since the civil war, were clearly
past by 1971, and the Church was seeking to move away from
the strict conservatism Franco's government still espoused.
The year 1973 proved to be the most bitter in church-state
98. Id. at 157.
99. N. COOPER,
supra note 84, at 40.
100. TRIUNFO,
Feb. 21, 1976, at 33.
101. S. PETSCHEN,
supra note 93, at 157.
102. F. GIL DELGADO,
supra note 87, at 28.
103. N. COOPER,
supra note 84, at 40.
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relations.lo4The CEE issued "La Iglesia y la Comunidad Politica " ("The Church and the Political Community"), which called
for separation of the Church and the State and made specific
recommendations as to certain rights and actions that bishops
should demand for their people.lo6 During a heated debate in
the Cortes over a proposed bill on conscientious objectors and
military service, the CEE offered strong support for the more
liberal antigovernment stands on the subject.106In April, rightwing Guerrilleros de Cristo Rey (Guerillas of Christ the King)
attacked and severely beat a group of fifteen Basque nationalist
demonstrators, including five priests who were derisively referred to as curas rojas (red priests).lo7 The Bishop of Bilbao
excommunicated the Guerrilleros involved in the incident,
whereas the government judge before whom the Guerrilleros appeared dismissed the case without a trial.loBRight-wing, government-condoned agitation became so pervasive that at the official
funeral of Carrero Blanco, the Vice President of Spain who was
assassinated in December 1973, the mass given by Archbishop
Tarancon was interrupted by offensive shouts, such as "Tarancon to the firing squad" and "death to the red bishops."10s
In February 1974, Anoveros, the Bishop of Bilbao, released
a pastoral letter declaring that the Basques were hindered in
their just liberty and their rightful cultural expression; he called
for changes to allow them to be given such rights. The Franco
government responded by placing Anoveros under house arrest
and asking him to leave the country. Anoveros refused and
threatened to excommunicate anyone who forced him. Only
frantic negotiations involving Archbishop Tarancon and the papal nuncio resolved the crisis.l1°
Throughout this period the conflict was not limited to the
level of bishops. Numerous fines were imposed on priests for
speaking out in homilies or disturbing the public order in other
ways.ll1 Rightists continued to attack liberal, reform-minded
104. F. G a DELGADO,
supra note 87, at 235.
105. Id. at 204, 216-34.
106. Id. at 204-05.
107. Id. at 235. See also N. COOPER,
supra note 84, at 42; S. PETSCHEN,
supra note
93, at 143.
supra note 87, at 236.
108. F. G a DELGADO,
supra note 84, at 42.
109. Id. at 238. See also N. COOPER,
supra note 84, at 43.
110. N. COOPER,
Jan. 17,1976, at 49. Fines were used because they were not prohibited
111. TRIUNFO,
in the Concordat.
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priests and laymen.l12 When the Catholic moderate paper, Ya,
called for a "radical reassessment of the political situation" since
reform was "long overdue," the editor was indicted, but the case
was dismissed.llg The Church was moving away from the close
church-state identification of the Franco period, and the government resisted that movement wherever possible. The Spanish
Church was learning a lesson that should have been evident
from its own history: When no real provisions have been made
for safeguarding religious freedom, close ties between church
and state can result in severe restrictions on a church, when either it or the government changes direction.

B. Church-State Relations 1975-1977
An incident of church-state conflict in March, 1975, has
been hailed as marking the beginning of the separation of
church and state in Spain."' At that time the Archdiocese of
Madrid had planned a "Christian Assembly" in the Madrid
working class suburb of Vallecas as a dialogue between
parishioners and priests on the social needs of the people and
what the Church could do to meet those needs. A day before the
assembly was to begin, the government refused to grant the necessary permit for such a large meeting. Archbishop Tarancon issued a pastoral letter condemning the government action and
demanded an explanation, which never came.l16
Immediately after Franco's death the situation seemed to
continue as before. On December 7, 1975, a recently released
priest and labor organizer was returned to prison on a charge of
organizing an unauthorized demonstration. The priest had
merely addressed a crowd that had gathered to welcome him
back to Madrid.'ls One priest was arrested for involvement in
demonstrations demanding amnesty, a focal point in the conflict
between the Church and the State.l17In February, 1976, the Abbot of the Montserrat Monastery called for amnesty at a mass
attended by the King and Queen.l18 The Church's new attitude
was summarized in statements by Tarancon in December, 1975,
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
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at the annual meeting of the Conferencia Episcopal Espaliola
(CEE). He advocated amnesty for all those who had been imprisoned or forced into exile for purely political reasons, and
stated:
The theme that a Spain which is not Catholic is not Spain, no
longer serves to express today the new relations between the
Church and the rest of the world between religion and the Patria, nor between faith and politics. That change must be accepted because each day the difference between civil and ecclesiastical society becomes more and more accentuated.ll@

At first the position of the government toward these
changes appeared uncertain. Interior Minister Manuel Fraga
Iribarne issued a statement that many of the laws restricting assembly and religion would be only selectively enforced;120 however, such statements were given little credence after incidents
like the tear-gassing of a workers' meeting in a church in Vittoria, where police killed four workers.121
In 1976, however, the posture of the government gradually
changed. A series of amnesties freed most of the political prisoners, and the exiles returned.lSSA political reform law created a
new freely-elected Cortes, and all political parties, including the
Communist party, were legalized.lSSThe attitude of the new government toward religious questions is best illustrated by the recent change in the Concordat of 1953. On July 28, 1976, Spain
surrendered the right of Juan Carlos, as Chief of State, to appoint Spanish bishops, and the Vatican surrendered the right of
priests to an ecclesiastical forum, by which bishops had been
able to block the civil trials of priests and nuns.lu Although it
was only the first step in a delicate and difficult job of disentanglement, this change reflected the more moderate direction
church-state identification was taking in Spain. Spain was finally
moving away from its former confessional-state status to a more
moderate position.
Where the Church and the State for four decades have been
so thoroughly enmeshed, and where both historically and culturally the union has been complete, except for brief and bitter mo119.
120.
121.
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ments, the process of separation is difficult and can be very emotional. In 1976 three major legal tasks confronted Spain: first,
the issues of church-state identification and religious freedom
had to be constitutionally delineated; secondly, within those
constitutional limits the implementing legislation had to be
carefully drafted to treat a myriad of key issues, including marriage, death, education and taxes; and finally, the Concordat
with the Vatican had to be replaced with an arrangement that
recognized the new realities and eliminated the conflicts that already existed in the legal structure established by the Concordat
in areas such as Spanish family law.
The question of church-state relations was at the forefront
of the debate surrounding the new Constitution. In November,
1977, the rough draft of the new Constitution was leaked from
the closed-door committee to the press. Its appearance coincided
with the annual meeting of the CEE. The Catholic leaders in
this meeting issued a statement analyzing the problems of declaring Spain a nonconfessional state.12s The CEE was concerned not only with article 3 of the rough draft, which guaranteed religious liberty and also stated that the Spanish State is
not confessional, but also with article 31, which guaranteed free
education for everyone, yet made no provision for handling the
large number of government-financed Catholic schools.126The
CEE spoke out on both of these issues. In what was an apparent
contradiction to the position taken by the Church in recent
years favoring separation of the Church and the State, the bishops called for the elimination of any statement that the State is
nonconfessional; they also advocated an explicit recognition of
the historical and social reality of the role the Catholic Church
plays in Spanish society.12' The CEE's statements against total
secularization of education and removal of public financing of
parochial schools have been followed by an impressive campaign
for freedom of education, which means continued support of
Church schools for those parents who wish to send their children
to Catholic schools. Two weeks after the CEE statements the
campaign surfaced with a massive public rally in Madrid calling
attention to the dangers inherent in having only lay sch001s.l~~
These developments were reminiscent of the early days of
125.
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the Second Republic, causing emotions and fears to run high in
Madrid. Fortunately under the surface were calmer waters so
that the new Constitution and the accompanying implementing
legislation avoided the extremes of both the Second Republic
and the Franco years.
From this climate of moderation and compromise came the
Spanish Constitution of 1978 that separated the Catholic
Church from the State by declaring in section 3 of article sixteen: "No religion shall have a state character. The public powers shall take into account the religious beliefs of Spanish society and maintain the appropriate relations of cooperation with
the Catholic Church and other denomination^."^^^ This moves
Spain along the line of church-state identification to the clear
separation called for by the Church during the last years of the
Franco era and sought by nearly everyone since Franco's death.
For the first time in a long and bitter constitutional history, it
appears that Spain may find a point on the identification line
that suits her cultural and national composition.
Unlike all past Spanish constitutions, this one was the result of the efforts of nearly all sectors of Spanish society. It
passed by an almost unanimous vote in both houses of the Spanish Cortes on October 31, 1978. As one Spanish newspaper
observed:
The Constitution of 1978 is different than all others. It has
been composed by the enemies of yesterday, working elbow to
elbow, converted for this high occasion to cooperating adversaries. It arises not from a forced imposition, but from a pact. It
is not the Constitution of half of Spain against the other half,
but of nearly all Spaniards for all Spaniards. Neither the
Church as such nor the Armed Forces as such have participated in the debates nor in the votes; the renowned military
men designated senators by the King have not contended to
represent the Armed Forces, nor have the respectable priests,
[elected deputies and senators from the center and socialist
parties] represented the Church. The vote of neither the former nor the latter was unanimous. Church and Army have fulfilled, in the constituent process, their secular function as internal supportive institutions, rather than their long-attributed
role as supplementary political institution^.'^^
129. 13 CONSTITUTIONS
OF THE COUNTRIES
OF THE WORLD,SPAIN4 (A. Blaustein & G.
Flanz eds. 1979).
130. ABC, Nov. 15,1978,at 3.
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Separation of church and state is now established not only
constitutionally in Spain, but also in the attitudes and philosophies of both secular and ecclesiastical leaders. While the new
Constitution does not "forcefully impose the name of God"lS1 on
the Spanish people, it does recognize the special character of
churches, particularly the Catholic Church. For example, all
churches have been extended special status as public
corporations.
Implementing legislation will of necessity further delineate
the exact nature of the roles state and church will play in Spain
under the new Constitution. However, unlike many nations of
the world, the separation of church and state in Spain will not
remove the Catholic Church from the active involvement dictated by its dominant position in Spanish culture and society.
The exact point Spain will assume on the separation portion of
the identification line will be determined by the political process
of the new Spanish democracy.

C. Religous Liberty in Spain 1967-1977
The Organic Law of 1967 introduced the concept, or at least
the language, of religious liberty into the Spanish Constitution.
As with other constitutional declarations, such as the one found
in the Constitution of 1876, the actual degree of religious liberty
permitted depends on the implementing legislation that interprets the constitutional terms. That legislation principally took
the form of the Religious Liberty Act of 1967.lS2Enactment of
this Act was delayed for much of 1967 by opposition within the
Cortes where conservative groups, in both the Church and the
State, still held almost total power.laSThose within the Church
feared a sudden onslaught of proselyting among a Catholic population totally unprepared to handle it, and those within the
State feared a loss of the kind of total control that the government had been able to maintain, even over Catholics.ls4 These
forces shaped the form the law took. The new law met the constitutional mandate of religious freedom, fulfilled Vatican 11's
declaration on religious liberty, and preserved the State's control. However, the ultimate confessionality of Spain was guaran131. Id.
132. Ley 44i1967, 156 Boletin Oficial del Estado 9191-94 (July 4, 1967).
Ed. Note - After this Comment was written, the Spanish Cortes passed a new Organic Law of Religious Liberty. The law nullifies Ley 4411967 and is another step towards religious freedom in Spain. A full evaluation of the new law must await the enactment of more detailed implementation legislation by the Cortes and its application by
'national and local officials.
133. J. MONROY,
supk note 15, at 8.
134. S. PETSCHEN,
supra note 93, at 147.
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teed in such a way as to place Spain not in the religious liberty
portion, but the religious toleration portion, of that line.
The Religious Liberty Act of 1967 guaranteed the right to
profess both privately and publicly one's religion within certain
limitations. Religious liberty was subordinated to the Catholic
confessionality of the Spanish State. All persons had to manifest
respect for the official religion of the State and for public order.lS6The Religious Liberty Act of 1967, much like the Constitution of 1876, guaranteed the individual's right to religious liberty provided the exercise of that right did not encroach upon
the Catholic Church or in some way endanger the State.
Confessional associations (the term applied to non-Catholic
churches) were recognized and given the right to hold meetings,
but only in temples and other authorized places.lS6Before the
status of a confessional asshiation could be attained, each
church had to register with the government and be approved.lS7
The possessions of such associations, limited to those things actually used by its membership, had to be registered and used
only for statutorily allowed purposes.1s8 All confessional associations were required to submit a yearly report on the receipt and
disposition of donation^.'^@ The Ministry of Justice reserved the
right to suspend the activities of any association believed to be
expending money for impermissible purposes.140Finally, all acts
by the associations or individual members which could be
viewed as proselyting were prohibited."'
Four major principles characterized the Religious Liberty
Act of 1967:
1) The Spanish State tried to make compatible the continuance of traditional control of non-Catholics (just as it controlled
Catholics) with the new Catholic doctrines of religious
freedom.142
2) The Act continued to respect the position of Spain as a
Catholic, confessional state.14s
3) The Act reflected the Spanish legislature's preoccupation
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Ley 4411967, art. 2.1, 156 Boletin Oficial del Estado 9191-94 (July 4, 1967).
Id. art. 21.
Id. art. 14.
Id. art. 18.
Id. art. 18.2.
Id. art. 18.3.
Id. art. 2.2.
A. DE LA HERA,PLURALISMO
Y LIBERTAD
RELIGIOSA
85 (1971).
Id. at 85-86.
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with expressly incorporating each aspect of Vatican I1 into its
laws of religious liberty."'
4) Because the right to register could be denied only if
mechanical procedures were not followed, in effect, all non-Catholic groups could achieve legal status. In that registration process there was a danger that the law could become a kind of
apartheid for non-Catholics because even though it insured
equality of rights on the individual level, it prohibited most
forms of aggressive proselyting, required registration of all ministers, and allowed close governmental control of all finances.14'
Criticism and opposition to the Act came from many
quarters. Many of the non-Catholic groups in Spain refused to
register either because they feared that such registration would
only make harassment or persecution easier, or because they believed that the law did not in reality represent true religious
freedom and therefore should not be complied with.146 As recently as 1970, three major Protestant groups still refused to
register.147
The Religious Liberty Act of 1967 has also been criticized
for failing to meet the spirit of Vatican IL14BBy protecting the
confessional status of the State and leaving control over other
religions in the hands of the government, the Act failed to meet
the Vatican I1 concept that there can be no special recognition
for one religion unless religious liberty for others is concomitantly g~aranteed."~The Act not only left more legal control
with the state than Vatican I1 prescribed, it also failed to comply with Vatican I1 in social matters, especially in its limitation
of non-Catholic public religious manifestation^.^^^ In reality, the
Religious Liberty Act of 1967 was merely a statute of religious
toleration conceded to the non-Catholic minority, and was not
the kind of constitutional safeguard of religious liberty envisioned by Vatican II.161
Because of the Spanish State's extensive control of the application of the law, and the limitations placed on the confes144. Id. at 86-87.
145. Id. at 87-91.
supra note 84, at 37-38.
146. See N. COOPER,
147. A. DE LA HERA,Supra note 142, at 91.
LA LIBERTAD
RELIGIOSA
EN ESPARAY
148. J. PEREZ-LLANTADA,
(1974).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 471.
151. Id.

EL

VATICANO
11 470
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sional associations, the efficacy of the law depended greatly on
whether the civil rights of non-Catholics were respected in local
incidents. Generally, non-Catholic groups found that during the
early years of the law they were able to hold regular religious
services without harrassment, but activity beyond that depended
on the attitude of the local officials and police. Although little
has been written about those years and the operation of the law
of religious liberty, discussions with leaders of non-Catholic
groups indicate a varying pattern of toleration and harassment.
Missionaries were sometimes jailed for street proselyting and in
some cases ordered out of towns. Plainclothes police kept close
surveillance of non-Catholic individuals and were known to
break up meetings held in private homes when attended by
more than six persons.lS2
Observations of the author and discussions with some religious leaders indicate that during the Juan Carlos years nearly
all of the harassment has disappeared. The police no longer appear to be continually watching and interfering with the activities of non-Catholics. This expanded freedom has also been accompanied by an increase in the amount of media publicity
given non-Catholic groups. The number of non-Catholic religious adherents, and the number of their physical facilities have
significantly increased.
The high positive identification between the Catholic
Church and the Spanish State has decreased, and religious freedom has correspondingly increased. Evidence of this is found in
article sixteen of the new Constitution:
1) Freedom of ideology, religion, and cult of individuals and
communities is guaranteed without any limitation in their
demonstrations other than that which is necessary for the
maintenance of public order protected by law.
2) No one may be obliged to make a declaration on his ideology, religion, or beliefs.lSs

While further changes are expected because of modifications
in the church-state identification provisions of the new Constitution, Spain has clearly moved into the full religious liberty sec152. The author spent considerable time in Spain during this period and these conclusions are drawn from his observations and from discussions with Catholic priests and
non-Catholic church leaders.
153. 13 C o ~ s ~ r r u n OF
o ~THE
s COUNTRIES
OF THE WORLD,
SPAIN4 (A. Blaustein & G.
Flanz eds. 1979).
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tion of that line.

A. Changes in Spain 1967-1979
In 1967, the Spanish State passed the Organic Law that attempted to move Spain into the religious freedom portion of
that line without making a change in church-state identification.
However, as the model indicates, religious liberty was impossible
without some corresponding movement in church-state identification. Consequently, the Religious Liberty Act of 1967 achieved
only religious toleration because conservative elements in the
Church and the State blocked any changes in church-state
identification.
Although there were no further changes in the religious laws
of the State until after Franco's death, there were dramatic
changes within the Church throughout the late 1960's and early
1970's. Through a process of natural attrition by death and retirement combined with continuing papal influence in the appointment of new bishops, a group of younger bishops led by
Cardinal Tarancon assumed the leadership of the Spanish Catholic Church. These new bishops, as well as a majority of the
lower clergy, followed the philosophical lines of post-conciliar,
international Catholicism. They saw the role of the Church as
being social as well as spiritual. The Church was to help the
masses, promote social justice, and defend and protect the oppressed. Gone were the days of National Catholicism when the
Church was viewed as a mainstay of the oligarchy.
These new positions brought the Church into conflict with
the State. For the first time in thirty or forty years the two institutions were not pursuing parallel, mutually beneficial courses.
Relations between the State and the liberal Church hierarchy
deteriorated to such an extent that a bishop was even arrested
and threatened with exile. The Catholic Church painfully
learned that where high positive identification exists there is in
reality no religious freedom, even for the dominant church.
The death of Franco and the end of his dictatorship finally
brought changes within the government. Juan Carlos and his
ministers began to dismantle the dictatorship and erect a democracy within the same governmental superstructure. In the
area of church-state relations, the only initial documental or
structural change was an agreement with the Vatican wherein
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Juan Carlos surrendered the right of patronage and the Church
in return gave up the right of ecclesiastical forum. Increased
freedom of press, permitting open discussion of nearly everything, including religious matters, was visible evidence of further
change. Although no formal separation of the Church and the
State had been declared, there was, in the early stages, tacit
agreement that such an approach was necessary. Groundwork
for acceptance of the new Constitution was being laid.
With these changes in the Catholic Church and the State,
Spain had unofficially shifted its position on the identification
line. There was, therefore, a corresponding movement on the religious liberty line to an area of de facto religious liberty. The
new Constitution made religious liberty de jure. Implementing
legislation must soon follow to establish safeguards in the legal
system to protect it. While the details of future Spanish churchstate relations cannot be predicted, the following broad observations are evident from the developments of the past decade, especially in light of earlier church-state relations in Spain. Given
the power of the Catholic Church and center- and right-wing
forces in Spain and the apparent acceptance by the left-wing of
the need to recognize the social reality of the Church, a higher
degree of church-state identification in comparison to the degree
of church-state separation in other nations will likely occur.
Eventually, a system will probably emerge involving ceremonial
and governmental connections like those between the Church of
England and the government of Great Britain, coupled with
financial and legal recognition arrangements similar to those in
the Federal Republic of Germany. Government funding for
Church programs in areas such as education, restoration of historical buildings, and social welfare will also likely continue.
Apart from the official relations between institutions,
Church political involvement will almost certainly continue. In a
country where a large percentage of the population is Catholic,
the Church can be expected and ought to have every right to
speak out in persuasive, but not commanding, tones on subjects
affecting not only the Church as an institution, but her individual members. Real success in the separation of the Church and
State and in the implementation of religious liberty will come
when the Catholic Church can play the important role that its
history and numerical superiority in Spain require and still allow the development of a more pluralistic society.
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B. Implications Inherent in the Model
One of the purposes of this comparative analysis of churchstate relations in Spain during her constitutional period is to develop a model that can be applied to church-state relations
generally.

Some Identification
of Church and State

\

Positive Identification

\
Total Religious
Freedom

Separation of Church
and State

Religious
Toleration

Negative Identification

No Religious
Freedom

Although the model has proved valid in analyzing both historical and contemporary Spanish church-state problems, other
useful observations may also be made. On several occasions in
Spanish history, a change in government has taken place that,
with no accompanying constitutional or institutional changes,
has brought the Spanish State from a position of positive identification to one of negative or anti-Church identification. At least
one historical example of the reverse process occurred when
France moved from the anticlerical persecutions of the Revolution to the Concordat with the Vatican under Napoleon in relatively few years.lM This ease of movement is explained by the
close proximity in the model of both positive and negative identification to no religious freedom. As the Spanish Church has
discovered several times in its history, and most recently during
the last years of the Franco period, the church that maintains
close identification with a state is free only as long as its desires
parallel those of the state. When the church tries to take a different course than that of the state, conflicts and tensions, like
154. C. CORRAL
SALVADOR,
supra note 3, at 53-60.
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those observed in the late 1960's and early 1970's in Spain, are
likely to occur. The result is that the church will suffer because
of the bonds that tie it to the state.
Another general principle, evident from the model, is that
religious freedom can cease to exist whenever identification becomes either highly positive or highly negative. This conclusion
is supported not only by Spanish history but by current conditions in many nations.
Another conclusion evident from Spanish history is that religious liberty can be destroyed by excessive actions to eliminate
identification of church and state. Such was the case during the
Second Spanish Republic. However, the Spanish experience in
the last fifteen years has shown that it is possible to have a gradual movement from high positive identification to separation of
church and state, provided the movement is accompanied by an
ever-increasing amount of religious freedom, and the written
laws governing religious liberty are sufficiently broad.
The model also demonstrates the wide area the identification loop provides in the religious freedom section of that line.
The wide variety of identification combinations implied by the
loop is evidenced by the varying patterns of friendly separation
and mild identification found among the countries of the world
recognizing and practicing religious freedom. Since each nation
is different, each must find its own answers to the questions of
church-state relations while maintaining the universal goal of religious freedom. The future will show if Spain and other nations
can discover the degree of separation of church and state that
meets the realities of their own unique social and historical circumstances, but that also establishes true religious freedom.

George R. Ryskamp

